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Online Social Networks (OSNs) have become one of the major platforms for social in-
teractions, such as building up relationship, sharing personal experiences, and providing
other services. The wide adoption of OSNs raises privacy concerns due to personal data
shared online. Privacy control mechanisms have been deployed in popular OSNs for users
to determine who can view their personal information. However, user's sensitive infor-
mation could still be leaked even when privacy rules are properly configured. We inves-
tigate the effectiveness of privacy control mechanisms against privacy leakage from the
perspective of information flow. Our analysis reveals that the existing privacy control
mechanisms do not protect the flow of personal information effectively. By examining
representative OSNs including Facebook, Googleþ, and Twitter, we discover a series of
privacy exploits. We find that most of these exploits are inherent due to the conflicts be-
tween privacy control and OSN functionalities. The conflicts reveal that the effectiveness
of privacy control may not be guaranteed as most OSN users expect. We provide remedies
for OSN users to mitigate the risk of involuntary information leakage in OSNs. Finally, we
discuss the costs and implications of resolving the privacy exploits.
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Online Social Networks (OSNs) have become an essential
element in modern life for human beings to stay connected to
each other. About 82% online population use at least one OSN
such as Facebook, Googleþ, Twitter, and Linkedln, which fa-
cilitates building relationship, sharing personal experiences,
and providing other services (Aquino, 2012). Via OSNs,
massive amount of personal data is published online and
accessed by users from all over the world. Prior research
(Zheleva and Getoor, 2009; Johnson et al., 2012; Chaabane
et al., 2012; Balduzzi et al., 2010) shows that it is possible to
infer undisclosed personal data from publicly shared infor-
mation. Nonetheless, the availability and quality of the public
data causing privacy leakage are decreasing due to the
following reasons: 1) privacy control mechanisms have
become the standard feature of OSNs and keep evolving. 2) the
percentage of users who choose not to publicly share infor-
mation is also increasing (Chaabane et al., 2012). In this ten-
dency, it seems that privacy leakage could be prevented as
increasingly comprehensive privacy control is in place. How-
ever, this may not be achievable according to our findings.
Instead of focusing on new attacks, we investigate the
problem of privacy leakage under privacy control (PLPC). PLPC
refers to private information leakage even if privacy rules are
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properly configured and enforced. For example, Facebook al-
lows its users to control over who can view their friend lists on
Facebook. Alice, who has Bob in her friend list on Facebook,
may not allow Bob to view her complete friend list. As an
essential functionality, Facebook recommends to Bob a list of
users, called “people you may know”, to help Bob make more
friends. This list is usually compiled by enumerating the
friends of Bob's friends on Facebook, which includes Alice's
friends. Even though Alice doesn't allow Bob to view her friend
list, Alice's friend list could be leaked as recommendation to
Bob by Facebook.
We investigate the underlying reasons that make privacy
control vulnerable from the perspective of information flow.
We start with categorizing the personal information of anOSN
user into three attribute sets according to who the user is, whom
the user knows, and what the user does, respectively. We model
the information flow between these attribute sets and
examine the functionalities which control the flow. We
inspect representative real-world OSNs including Facebook,
Googleþ, and Twitter, where privacy exploits and their cor-
responding attacks are identified.
Our analysis reveals that most of the privacy exploits are
inherent due to the underlying conflicts between privacy
control and essential OSN functionalities. The recommenda-
tion feature for social relationship is a typical example, where
it helps expanding a user's social network but it may also
conflict with other users' privacy concerns for hiding their
social relationships. Therefore, the effectiveness of privacy
control may not be guaranteed even if it is technically
achievable. We investigate necessary conditions for protect-
ing against privacy leakage due to the discovered exploits and
attacks. Based on the necessary conditions, we provide sug-
gestions for users to minimize the risk of involuntary infor-
mation leakage when sharing private personal information in
OSNs.
We analyze the potentially vulnerable users due to our
identified attacks through user study, in which we investigate
participants' usage, knowledge, and privacy attitudes towards
Facebook, Googleþ, and Twitter. Based on the collected data,
we investigate the vulnerability of these participants who
could leak the private information through the attacks. We
further discuss the costs and implications of resolving these
privacy exploits.
We summarize the contributions of this paper as follows:
 We investigate the interaction between privacy control and
information flow in OSNs. We show that the conflict be-
tween privacy control and essential OSN functionalities
restricts the effectiveness of privacy control in OSNs.
 We identify privacy exploits for current privacy control
mechanisms in typical OSNs, including Facebook, Googleþ,
and Twitter. Based on these privacy exploits, we introduce
a series of attacks for adversaries with different capabil-
ities to obtain private personal information.
 We investigate necessary conditions for protecting against
privacy leakage due to the discovered exploits and attacks.
We provide suggestions for users to minimize the risk of
privacy leakage in OSNs. We also analyze the costs and
implications of resolving discovered exploits. While it is
possible to fix the exploits due to implementation defects,
it is not easy to eliminate the inherent exploits due to the
conflicts between privacy control and the functionalities.
These conflicts reveal that the effectiveness of privacy
control may not be guaranteed as most OSN users expect.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
provides background information about OSNs. Section 3 pre-
sents our threat model and assumptions. Section 4 models
information flows between attribute sets in OSNs. Section 5
presents discovered exploits, attacks, and mitigations for the
exploits. Section 6 analyzes the potentially vulnerable users
due to the attacks. Section 7 discusses the implications of our
findings. Finally, Section 8 describes related work and Section
9 summarizes our conclusions.
2. Background
In a typical OSN, Alice owns a space which consists of a profile
page and a feed page for publishing Alice's personal informa-
tion and receiving other users' personal information, respec-
tively. Alice's profile page displays Alice's personal
information, which can be viewed by others. Alice's feed page
displays other users' personal information which Alice would
like to keep up with. The personal information in a user's
profile page can be categorized into three attribute sets: a)
personal particular set (PP set), b) social relationship set (SR
set), and c) social activity set (SA set), according to who the
user is, whom the user interact with, and what the user does,
respectively. We show corresponding personal information
and attribute sets on Facebook, Googleþ, and Twitter in
Table 1.
Alice's PP set describes persistent facts about Alice in an
OSN, such as gender, date of birth, and race, which usually do
not change frequently. Alice's SR set records her social re-
lationships in an OSN, which consist of an incoming list and an
outgoing list. The incoming list consists of the users who
include Alice as their friendswhile the outgoing list consists of
the users whomAlice includes as her friends. In particular, on
Googleþ, the incoming list and the outgoing list correspond to
“have you in circles” and “your circles”, respectively. On
Twitter, the incoming list and the outgoing list correspond to
“following” and “follower”, respectively. The social relation-
ships in certain OSNs aremutual. For example, on Facebook, if
Alice is a friend of Bob, Bob is also a friend of Alice. In such a
case, a user's incoming list and outgoing list are the same,
which are called friend list. Lastly, Alice's SA set describes
Alice's social activities in her daily life. The SA set includes
status messages, photos, links, videos, etc.
To enable users protect their personal information in the
three attribute sets, most OSNs provide privacy control, by
which users may set up certain privacy rules to control the
disclosure of their personal information. Given a piece of
personal information, the privacy rules specify who can/
cannot view the information. A privacy rule usually contains
two types of lists, white list, and black list. A white list specifies
who can view the information while a black list specifies who
cannot view the information. A white/black list could be local
or global. If a white/black list is local, this list takes effect on
specific information only (e.g. an activity, age information, or
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gender information). If a white/black list is global, this list
takes effect on all information in a user's profile page. For
example, if Alice wants to share a status with all her friends
except Bob, Alice may use a local white list which includes all
Alice's friends, as well as a local black list which includes Bob
only. If Alice doesn't want to share any information with Bob,
she may use a global black list which includes Bob.
To help users share their personal information and interact
with each other, most OSNs provide four basic functionalities
including PUB, REC, TAG, and PUSH. The first three function-
alities, PUB, REC, and TAG, mainly affect the personal infor-
mation displayed in a user's profile page, while the last
functionality PUSH makes some other users' personal infor-
mation appear in the user's feed page. These basic function-
alities are described as follows. We exclude any other
functionalities which are not relevant to our findings.
Alice can use PUB functionality to share her personal in-
formation with other users. As shown in Fig. 1a, PUB displays
Alice's personal information in her profile page. Other users
may view Alice's personal information in Alice's profile page.
To help Alice make more friends in an OSN, REC is an
essential functionality by which the OSN recommends to
Alice a list of users that Alicemay include in her SR set. The list
of recommended users is composed based on the social re-
lationships of the users in Alice's SR set. Considering an
example shown in Fig. 1b, Alice's SR set consists of Bob while
Bob's SR set consists of Alice, Carl, Derek, and Eliza. After Alice
logs into her space, REC automatically recommends Carl,
Derek, and Eliza to Alice who may update her SR set. If Alice
intends to include Carl in her SR set, Alice may need Carl's
approval depending on OSN implementations. Upon approval
if needed, Alice can include Carl in her SR set. At the same
time, Alice is automatically included in Carl's SR set. In
particular, on Facebook, if Alice intends to include Carl in her
SR set, Alice needs to get Carl's approval. Upon approval, Alice
includes Carl in her friend list. Meanwhile, Facebook auto-
matically includes Alice in Carl's friend list. On Googleþ, Alice
can include Carl in her outgoing list without Carl's approval.
Then Googleþ automatically includes Alice in Carl's incoming
list. On Twitter, if Alice intends to include Carl in her SR set,
Alice may need Carl's approval depending on Carl's option
whether his approval is required. Upon approval if required,
Alice includes Carl in her incoming list. Then Twitter includes
Alice in Carl's outgoing list automatically.
To motivate users' interactions, TAG functionality allows a
user to mention another user's name in his/her social activ-
ities when the user publishes social activities in his/her profile
page. In Fig. 1c, when Alice publishes a social activity in her
profile page, she can mention Bob in the social activity via
TAG, which provides a link to Bob's profile page (shown as an
HTML hyperlink).
For the convenience of keeping up with the personal in-
formation published by other users, OSNs provides feed page
for users. Considering an example in which Alice intends to
keep up with Bob, Alice can subscribe to Bob, and Alice is
called Bob's subscriber. As Bob's subscriber, Alice is included in
Bob's SR set. In particular, on Facebook, a user's subscribers are
usually his/her “friends”. On Googleþ, a user's subscribers are
usually the users in his/her outgoing list, i.e. “your circles”. On
Twitter, a user's subscribers are usually the users in his/her
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incoming list, i.e. “follower”. Fig. 1d shows that when Bob
updates his personal information via PUB and allows Alice to
view the updated personal information, a copy of the updated
personal information is automatically pushed to Alice's feed
page via PUSH. Then, Alice can view Bob's updated personal
information both in her feed page and in Bob's profile page.
3. Threat model
The problem of PLPC investigates privacy leakage in a system
where privacy control is enforced. Given a privacy control
mechanism, PLPC examines whether a user's private personal
information is leaked even if the user properly configures pri-
vacy rules to protect the corresponding information.
The problem of PLPC in OSNs involves two parties, distrib-
utor and receiver. A user who publishes and shares his/her
personal information is a distributor while the user whom the
personal information is shared with is a receiver. An adversary
is a receiver who intends to learn a distributor's information
that is not shared with him. Correspondingly, the target
distributor is referred to as victim.
Prior research (Zheleva and Getoor, 2009; Chaabane et al.,
2012; Balduzzi et al., 2010) mainly focuses the inference of
undisclosed user information from their publicly shared in-
formation. Since the effectiveness of these inference tech-
niques will be hampered by increasing user awareness of
privacy concern (Chaabane et al., 2012), we further include
insiders in our analysis. The adversaries have the incentive to
register as OSN users so that they may directly access a vic-
tim's private personal information or infer the victim's private
personal information from other users connected with the
victim in OSNs.
The capabilities of an adversary can be characterized ac-
cording to two factors. The first factor is the distance between
adversary and victim. According to privacy rules available in
existing OSNs, a distributor usually chooses specific receivers
to share her information based on the distance between the
distributor and the receivers. Therefore, we classify an
adversary's capability based on his distance to a victim.
Considering the social network as a directed graph, the
distance between two users can be measured by the number
of hops in the shortest connected path between the two users.
An n-hop adversary can be defined such that the length of the
shortest connected path from victim to adversary is n hops.
We consider the following three types of adversaries in our
discussion, 1-hop adversary, 2-hop adversary, and k-hop ad-
versary, where k > 2. On Facebook, they correspond to Friend-
only, Friend-of-Friend, and Public, respectively. On Googleþ,
they correspond to Your-circles, Extended-circles, and Public,
respectively. For ease of readability, we use friend, friend of
friend, and stranger to represent 1-hop adversary, 2-hop ad-
versary, and k-hop adversary (where k > 2) adversaries,
respectively: 1) If an adversary is a friend of a victim, he is
stored in the outgoing list in the victim SR set. The adversary
can view the victim's information that is shared with her
friends, friends of friends, or all receivers in an OSN. However,
the adversary cannot view the information that is not shared
with any receivers (e.g. the “onlyme” option on Facebook). 2) If
an adversary is a friend of friend, he can view the victim's
information shared with her friend-of-friends or all receivers.
However, the adversary cannot view any information that is
sharedwith friends only, or any information that is not shared
with any receivers. 3) If an adversary is a stranger, he can
access the victim's information that is shared with all re-
ceivers. However, the adversary cannot view any information
which is shared with friends of friends and friends.
Besides the above restrictions, an adversary cannot view a
victim's personal information if the adversary is included in
the victim's black lists (e.g. “except” or “block” option on
Facebook, and “block” option on Googleþ).
An adversary may have prior knowledge about a victim.
We will specify the exact requirement of such prior knowl-
edge for different attacks in Section 5.
Since a user may use multiple OSNs, it is possible for an
adversary to infer the user's private data by collecting and
analyzing the information shared in different OSNs. We
exclude social engineering attacks where a victim is deceived
to disclose her private information voluntarily. We also
exclude privacy leakage caused by improper privacy settings.
These two cases cannot be addressed completely by any
technical measures alone.
Fig. 1 e Basic functionalities in OSNs.
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4. Information flows between attribute sets
in profile pages
In this section, we examine explicit and implicit information
flows in OSNs. These information flows could leak users' pri-
vate information to an adversary even after the users have
properly configured the privacy rules to protect their
information.
As analyzed in Section 2, the personal information shared
in a user's profile page can be categorized into three attribute
sets including PP set, SR set, and SA set, which are illustrated
as circles in Fig. 2. The attribute sets of multiple users are
connected within an OSN, where personal information may
explicitly flow from a profile page to another profile page via
inter-profile functionalities, including REC (recommending) and
TAG (tagging), as represented by solid arrows and rectangles
in Fig. 2. It is also possible to access a user's personal infor-
mation in PP set and SR set via implicit information flows
marked by dashed arrows. The details about these informa-
tion flows are described below.
The first explicit flow is caused by REC, as shown in arrow
(1) in Fig. 2. REC recommends to an OSN user Bob a list of users
according to the social relationships of the users included in
Bob's SR set. Therefore, the undisclosed users included in
Alice's SR may be recommended to Bob via REC, if Bob is
connected with Alice.
The second explicit flow caused by TAG is shown in arrow
(2) in Fig. 2. A typical OSN user may mention the names of
other users in a social activity in SA set in his/her profile page
via TAG, which creates explicit links connecting SA setswithin
different profile pages.
The third flow is an implicit flow caused by the design of
information storage for SR sets, which is shown in arrow (3) in
Fig. 2. A user's SR set stores his/her social relationships as
connections. From the perspective of information flow, a
connection is a directional relationship between two users,
including a distributor and his/her 1-hop receiver, i.e. friend. The
direction of a connection represents the direction of infor-
mation flow. Correspondingly, Alice's SR set consists of an
incoming list and an outgoing list as defined in Section 2. For
each user ui in Alice's incoming list, there is a connection from
ui to Alice. For each user uo in Alice's outgoing list, there a
connection from Alice to uo. Alice can receive information
distributed from the users in her incoming list, and distribute
her information to the users in her outgoing list. Given a
connection from Alice to Bob, Bob is included in the outgoing
list in Alice's SR set. Meanwhile Alice is included in the
incoming list in Bob's SR set. The social relationships in certain
OSNs such as Facebook are mutual. Such mutual relationship
can be considered as a pair of connections linking two users
with opposite directions, similar to replacing a bidirectional
edge with two equivalent unidirectional edges.
The fourth flow is an implicit flow related to PP set, which is
shown as the arrow (4) in Fig. 2. Due to the homophily effect
(McPherson et al., 2001; Centola et al., 2007), a user is more
willing to connect with the users with similar personal par-
ticulars compared to other users with different personal par-
ticulars. This tendency can be used to link PP sets of multiple
users. For example, colleagues working in the same depart-
ment are often friends with each other on Facebook.
In addition to the above information flows, an OSN user
may simultaneously usemultiple OSNs, and thus create other
information flows connecting the attribute sets of the same
user across different OSNs.
It is difficult to prevent privacy leakage from all these in-
formation flows. A usermay be able to prevent privacy leakage
caused by explicit information flows by carefully using corre-
sponding functionalities, as these flows are materialized only
when inter-profile functionalities are used. However, it is
difficult to avoid privacy leakage due to implicit information
flows, as they are caused by inherent correlations among the
information shared in OSNs. In fact, all these four information
flows illustrated in Fig. 2 correspond to inherent exploits,
which will be analyzed in Sections 5 and 7. The existence of
these information flows introduces a large attack surface for
an adversary to access undisclosed personal information if any
of these flows is not properly protected. The existing privacy
control mechanisms (Carminati et al., 2009; Fong et al., 2009)
regarding data access within a profile page are not sufficient to
prevent against privacy leakage. However, the full coverage of
privacy control may not be feasible as it conflicts with social/
business values of OSNs as analyzed in Section 7.
In this paper, we focus on the information flows from the
attribute sets in a profile page to the attribute sets in another
profile page, which may lead to privacy leakage even if users
properly configure their privacy rules. There may exist other
exploitable information flows leading to privacy leakage,
which are left as our future work.
5. Exploits, attacks, and mitigations
In this section, we analyze the exploits and attacks whichmay
lead to privacy leakage in existing OSNs even if privacy con-
trols are enforced. We organize the exploits and attacks ac-
cording to their targets, which could be a victim's PP set, SR set,
and SA set. We also investigate necessary conditions
regarding prevention of privacy leakage due to the identified
exploits and attacks. The proofs of the necessary conditions
are available in Appendices. Based on these necessary con-
ditions, we provide suggestions on mitigating the corre-
sponding exploits and attacks. All of our findings have been
verified in real-world settings on Facebook, Googleþ, and
Twitter.1
Fig. 2 e Information flows between attribute sets.
1 All of our experiments were conducted from September, 2011
to September, 2012.
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5.1. PP set
A user's PP set describes persistent facts about who the user is.
The undisclosed information in PP set protected by existing
privacy control mechanisms can be inferred by the following
inherent exploits, namely inferable personal particular and cross-
site incompatibility.
5.1.1. Inferable personal particular
Human beings have the tendency to interact with others who
share the same or similar personal particulars (such as race,
organization, and education). This assumption is called
homophily (McPherson et al., 2001; Centola et al., 2007). Due to
homophily, users are connected with those who have similar
personal particulars at higher rate than with those who have
dissimilar personal particulars. This causes an inherent
exploit named inferable personal particulars, which corresponds
to the information flow shown as dashed arrow (4) in Fig. 2.
Exploit 1. If most of a victim's friends have common or similar
personal particulars (such as employer information), it could be
inferred that the victim may have the same or similar personal
particulars.
An adversary may use Exploit 1 to obtain undisclosed
personal particulars in a victim's PP set. The following is a
typical attack on Facebook.
Attack 1. Considering a scenario on Facebook shown in Fig. 3,
where Bob, Carl, Derek, and some other users are Alice's
friends, and Bob is a friend of Carl, Derek, and most of Alice's
friends (Note that in Fig. 3, a solid arrow connects from a
distributor to a friend of the distributor). Alice publishes her
employer information “XXX Agency” in her PP set and allows
Carl and Derek only to view her employer information. How-
ever, most of Alice's friends may publish their employer infor-
mation and allow their friends to view this information due to
different perceptions in privacy protection. In this setting, Bob
can collect the employer information of Alice's friends and infer
that Alice's employer is “XXX Agency” with high probability.
The above attack works on Facebook, Googleþ, and
Twitter. The attack can be performed by any adversary who
has two types of knowledge. The first type of knowledge in-
cludes a large portion of users stored in the victim's SR set. The
second type of knowledge includes the personal particulars of
these users. The attackmay lead to the leakage of the personal
particulars including employer, university, current city,
religion, etc. Other personal particulars, including gender, age,
and relationship status, may not be reliably inferred via the
above attack. But they can be leaked based on additional
context information such as users' and their friends' names,
social activities, and interests (Tang et al., 2011). To prevent
against privacy leakage due to Exploit 1, the following neces-
sary condition should be satisfied.
Necessary Condition 1. Given a subset U ¼ {u1,u2,…,un} of a
victim v's SR set in an OSN and personal particular value ppui
ðppuisnullÞ of each receiver ui 2 U which are obtained by an ad-
versary, there exists at least one personal particular value pp such
that

Upp

  Uv

 and pp s ppv where ppv is the victim's personal
particular value and Upp ¼ fui


ðui2UÞ∧ðppui ¼ ppÞg and
Uv ¼ fuj


ðuj2UÞ∧ðppuj ¼ ppvÞg.
To satisfy Necessary Condition 1, the followingmitigations
are suggested.
Mitigation 1. If a victim publishes information in her PP set and
allows a set of receivers to view the information, the privacy rules
chosen by the victim should be propagated to all users in the victim's
SR set who have similar or common information in their PP sets.
Mitigation 2. A victim should intentionally set up a certain number
of connections with other users who have different personal
particulars.
5.1.2. Cross-site incompatibility
If a user publishes personal information inmultiple OSNs, she
may employ different privacy control rules provided by
different OSNs. This causes an inherent exploit named cross-
site incompatibility.
Exploit 2. Personal information could be inferred in multiple OSNs
if it is protected by incompatible privacy rules in different OSNs.
The incompatibility of privacy rules in different OSNs is
due to: 1) inconsistent privacy rules in different OSNs, 2)
different social relationships in different OSNs, and 3)
different privacy control mechanisms in different OSNs (e.g.
different privacy control granularities). Due to Exploit 2, an
adversary may obtain a victim's personal particulars which
are hidden from the adversary in one OSN but are shared with
the adversary in another OSN. The following is an exemplary
attack on Facebook and Googleþ.
Attack 2. Bob is Alice's friend on both Googleþ and Facebook.
OnGoogleþ,Alicepublisheshergender information inherPPset
andshares this informationwith some friendsbutnot including
Bob. On Facebook, Alice publishes her gender information and
allows all users to view this information because Facebook al-
lows her to share it with either all users or no users. Comparing
Alice's personal information published on Facebook and
Googleþ, Bob is able to know Alice's gender published on Face-
book which is not supposed to be viewed by Bob on Googleþ.
Any adversary can perform this attack to infer personal
information in a victim's PP set from multiple OSNs. This
exploit can also be used to infer undisclosed information in SR
Fig. 3 e Alice and most of her friends have common
personal particulars (e.g. employer information).
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set and SA set. To prevent privacy leakage due to Exploit 2, the
following necessary condition needs to be satisfied.
Necessary Condition 2. Given a set of privacy rules
PR ¼ fpr1;pr2;…; prng and pri¼ (wli,bli)where pri is the privacy rule
for a victim's personal particular published in OSNi,wli is a set of all
receivers in a white list, and bli is a set of all receivers in a black list
for i 2 {1,2,…,n}, the following condition holds: for any
i,j2 {1,2,…,n}, wliybli ¼ wljyblj.2
To satisfy Necessary Condition 2, the following mitigation
strategies can be applied.
Mitigation 3. A victim should share her personal information with
the same users in all OSNs.
Mitigation 4. If different OSNs provide incompatible privacy control
on certain personal information, a victim should choose a privacy
rule for this information under two requirements: 1) the privacy rule
can be enforced in all OSNs; 2) the privacy rule is at least as rigid as
the privacy rules which the victim intends to choose in any OSNs.
5.2. SR set
A user's SR set records social relationships regarding whom
the user knows. The undisclosed information in SR set pro-
tected by existing privacy control mechanisms can be inferred
by two inherent exploits, namely inferable social relationship
and unregulated relationship recommendation.
5.2.1. Inferable social relationship
OSNs provide SR set for a user to store the lists of the userswho
have connections with him/her. If there exists a connection
from Alice to Carl, then Carl is recorded in the outgoing list in
Alice's SR set while Alice is recorded in the incoming list in
Carl's SR set. The connection between Alice and Carl is stored
in both Alice's SR set and Carl's SR set. This causes an inherent
exploit named inferable social relationship, which corresponds to
the information flow shown as dashed arrow (3) in Fig. 2.
Exploit 3. Each social relationship in a victim's SR set indicates a
connection between the victim and another user u. User u's SR
set also stores a copy of this relationship for the same connection. The
social relationship in the victim's SR set can be inferred from the SR
set of another user who is in the victim's SR set.
An adversary may use Exploit 3 to obtain undisclosed so-
cial relationships in a victim's SR set, which is shown in the
following exemplary attack on Facebook.
Attack 3. Fig. 4 shows a scenario on Facebook, where Bob is a
stranger to Alice, and Carl is Alice's friend. Alice shares her SR
set with a user group including Carl. Bob guesses Carl may be
connected with Alice, but cannot confirm this by viewing
Alice's SR set as it is protected against him (who is a stranger
to Alice). However, Carl shares his SR set to the public due to
different concerns in privacy protection. Seeing Alice in Carl's
SR set, Bob infers that Carl is Alice's friend.
Although the adversary is assumed to be a stranger in the
above attack, any adversary with stronger capabilities can
utilize Exploit 3 to perform the attack as long as he has two
types of knowledge: 1) a list of users in the victim's SR set; 2)
social relationships in these users' SR sets. This attack could be
a stepping stone for an adversary to infiltrate a victim's social
network. Once the adversary discovers a victim's friends and
establishes connections with them, he becomes a friend of the
victim's friends. After that, he has a higher probability to be
accepted as the victim's friend, as they have common friends
(Watts, 1999). To prevent privacy leakage caused by Exploit 3,
the following necessary condition should be satisfied.
Necessary Condition 3. Given a victim v's privacy rule
prv ¼ (wlv,blv) for her SR set, a set of all users U ¼ {u1,u2,…,un}
included in the victim's SR set in an OSN, and a set of privacy rules
PR ¼ fpr1;pr2;…; prng where each pri ¼ (wli,bli) is the privacy rule
for ui's SR set with white list wli and black list bli, the following
condition holds: for all i 2 {1,2,…,n}, wliybli4wlvyblv.
To satisfy Necessary Condition 3, the following mitigation
strategy can be applied.
Mitigation 5. Let U ¼ {u1,u2,…,um} denote the set of users in a
victim's SR set. If the victim shares her SR set with a set of receivers,
then each user ui 2 U should share the social relationship between
the user and the victim in the user's SR set with the same set of
receivers only. Since most of existing OSNs use coarse-grained pri-
vacy rules to protect social relationships in SR set, all users in the
victim's SR set should share their whole SR sets with the same set of
receivers chosen by the victim in order to prevent privacy leakage.
5.2.2. Unregulated relationship recommendation
To help a user build more connections, most OSNs provide
REC functionality to automatically recommend a list of other
users whom this user may know. The recommendation list is
usually calculated based on the relationships in SR set but not
regulated by the privacy rules chosen by the users in the
recommendation list. This causes an inherent exploit named
unregulated relationship recommendation, which corresponds to
the information flow shown as solid arrow (1) in Fig. 2.
Exploit 4. All social relationships recorded in a victim's SR set could
be automatically recommended by REC to all users in the victim's SR
set, irrespective of whether or not the victim uses any privacy rules to
protect her SR set.
An adversary may use Exploit 4 to obtain undisclosed so-
cial relationships in a victim's SR set, which is shown in the
following attack on Facebook.
Fig. 4 e Alice's social relationships flow to Carl's SR set.
2 Given a privacy rule pr ¼ {wl,bl} with a white listwl and a black
list bl, only the receivers who are in white list and are not in black
list (i.e. any receiver u2wlybl) are allowed to view the protected
information.
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Attack 4. On Facebook, Bob is a friend of Alice, but not in a
user group named Close_Friends. Alice shares her SR set
with Close_Friends only. Although Bob is not allowed to
view Alice's social relationships in her SR set, such informa-
tion is automatically recommended by REC to Bob as “users he
may know”. If Bob is connected with Alice only, the recom-
mendation list consists of the social relationships in Alice's SR
set only.
The recommendation list generated by REC may be
affected by other factors such as personal particulars and
interests, which may bring noise in social relationships. To
minimize such noise, Bob could temporarily delete all his
personal particulars and stay connected with the victim
only.
The attack may happen on both Facebook and Googleþ as
long as an adversary is a friend of a victim. There is no prior
knowledge required for this attack. The attack on Googleþ is
similar to the attack on Facebook but with a slight difference.
On Facebook, the adversary cannot be connected with the
victim unless the victim agrees since the relationship is
mutual. By contrast, the adversary can set up a connection
with the victim on Googleþwithout getting approval from the
victim because the connection is unidirectional. This may
make it easier for the adversary to obtain social relationships
in the victim's SR set via REC.
We have reported Exploit 4 to Facebook and got confir-
mation from them. Exploit 4 occurs because REC functionality
is implemented in a separate system not regulated by privacy
control of Facebook. To prevent privacy leakage due to Exploit
4, the following necessary condition should be satisfied.
Necessary Condition 4. Given a privacy rule pr ¼ (wl,bl) with
white list wl and black list bl for a victim's SR set in an OSN and a set
of all users U included in the SR set, the following condition holds:
U4wlybl.
To satisfy Necessary Condition 4, the following mitigation
strategy can be applied.
Mitigation 6. Let U ¼ {u1,u2,…,um} denote the set of users in a
victim's SR set. If the victim shares her SR set with a set of users
U04U only, the victim should remove any users in UyU0 from her SR
set in order to mitigate privacy leakage caused by REC.
5.3. SA set
A user's SA set contains social activities about what the user
does. The undisclosed information in SA set protected by
existing privacy control mechanisms can be inferred due to
the following inherent exploits and implementation defects,
including inferable social activity, ineffective rule update, and
invalid hiding list.
5.3.1. Inferable social activity
If two users are connected in OSNs, a user's name can be
mentioned by the other in a social activity via TAG such that
this social activity provides a link to the profile page of the
mentioned user. Such links create correlations among all the
users involved in the same activity. This causes an inherent
exploit named inferable social activity, which corresponds to the
information flow shown as solid arrow (2) in Fig. 2.
Exploit 5. If a victim's friend uses TAG to mention the victim in a
social activity published by the victim's friend, it implies that the
victim may also attend the activity, which is indicated by the link
created by TAG pointing to the victim's profile page. Although this
activity may involve the victim, the visibility of this activity is
solely determined by the privacy rules specified by the victim's
friend who publishes the activity, which is out of the control of the
victim.
An adversary may use Exploit 5 to obtain undisclosed so-
cial activities in a victim's SA set, which is shown in the
following attack on Facebook.
Attack 5. Fig. 5 shows a scenario on Facebook, where Bob
and Carl are Alice's friends, and Bob is Carl's friend. Alice
publishes a social activity in her SA set regarding a party
which Carl and she attended together and she allows Carl
only to view this social activity. However, Carl publishes the
same social activity in his SA set and mentions Alice via
TAG. Due to different concerns in privacy protection, Carl
allows all his friends to view this social activity. By viewing
Carl's social activity, Bob can infer that Alice attended this
party.
This attack works on Facebook, Googleþ, and Twitter. Any
adversary can perform this attack if he knows the social ac-
tivities published by the victim's friends pointing to the victim
via TAG. To prevent privacy leakage due to Exploit 5, the
following necessary condition should be satisfied.
Necessary Condition 5. Given a privacy rule pru ¼ (wlu,blu) for an
activity where a victim v is tagged by her friend u in an OSN and v's
intended privacy rule prv ¼ (wlv,blv) for the activity, the following
condition holds: wluyblu4wlvyblv.
To satisfy Necessary Condition 5, the following mitigation
strategy can be applied.
Mitigation 7. If a victim is mentioned in a social activity in another
user's SA via TAG, the victim should be able to specify additional
privacy rules to address her privacy concerns even when the social
activity is not in her profile page.
5.3.2. Ineffective rule update
It is common in OSNs that users regret sharing their social
activities with wrong audience. Typical reasons include being
in state of high emotion or under influence of alcohol (Wang
et al., 2011). It is necessary to allow users to correct their
Fig. 5 e Alice's social activities flow to Carl's SA set.
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 4 9 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 2 3 9e2 5 4246
mistakes by revoking the access rights of those unwanted
audience. Once the access right of viewing a particular social
activity is revoked, a receiver should not be able to view the
activity protected by the updated privacy rule. On Facebook, a
user can remove a receiver from the local white list specifying
who is allowed to view a social activity or add the receiver to
the local black list for the activity. Googleþ and Twitter
currently do not provide local black lists for individual social
activities. A user may remove a receiver from the white list or
from a user group if the user group is used to specify the scope
of the white list (e.g. sharing a social activity within a circle on
Googleþ). However, if a user's social activity has been pushed
to her subscribers' feed pages, the update of privacy rules on
Googleþ and Twitter does not apply to this social activity in
feed pages. This causes an implementation defect named
ineffective rule update.
Exploit 6. Once a victim publishes a social activity, the social ac-
tivity is immediately pushed to the feed pages of the victim's sub-
scribers who are allowed to view the social activity according to the
victim's privacy rule. Later, even after the victim changes the privacy
rule for this activity to disallow a subscriber to view this activity, the
social activity still appears in this subscriber's feed pages on Googleþ
and Twitter. The current implementation of Googleþ and Twitter
enforces a privacy rule only when a social activity is published and
pushed to corresponding subscribers' feed pages. Updated privacy
rules are not applied to the activities which have already been
pushed to feed pages (see Fig. 6).
An adversary may use Exploit 6 to obtain undisclosed so-
cial activities in a victim's SA set without the victim's aware-
ness. Below shows a typical attack on Googleþ.
Attack 6. On Googleþ, Bob is Alice's friend and subscriber.
Alice publishes a social activity and allows her friends in
group Classmate only to view the activity. Alice assigned Bob
to the group Classmate by mistake and realized this mistake
after publishing the activity. Then, Alice removed Bob from
the group. However, Bob can still view this social activity as it
has already been pushed to his feed page.
The above attack can happen on Googleþ and Twitter. To
perform the attack, an adversary should be the victim's
friend and subscriber. The attack doesn't work on Facebook as
privacy control in Facebook always actively examines
whether privacy rule for a social activity is updated. If a
privacy rule is updated, the privacy control is immediately
applied to the social activity in corresponding feed pages.
Consequently, the social activity is removed from the feed
pages. To prevent this attack in certain OSNs such as
Googleþ and Twitter, the following mitigation strategy can
be applied.
Mitigation 8. If a victimmistakenly shares a social activity with an
unintended receiver, instead of changing the privacy rules, the victim
should delete the social activity as soon as possible so that the social
activity is removed from all feed pages.
Note that Mitigation 8 is not effective unless the deletion of
the social activity takes place before an adversary views the
social activity. If the adversary views the social activity before
it is deleted, the adversary could keep a copy of this activity,
which cannot be prevented.
5.3.3. Invalid hiding list
To support flexible privacy control, many OSNs enable users
to use black lists so as to hide information from specific re-
ceivers. On Facebook, a local black list is called hiding list.
Using hiding list, a user may apply fine-grained privacy con-
trol on various types of personal information. However, the
hiding lists take no effect except for the user's friends. This
causes an implementation defect named invalid hiding list.
Exploit 7. In certain OSN, a victim may include some of her friends
in hiding lists to protect her personal information. However, when a
friend breaks his relationship with the victim, the OSN automatically
removes him from the hiding lists as the friend relationship termi-
nates. Releasing from hiding lists, this former friend is allowed to
view the victim's protected information if he is not restricted by other
privacy rules.
The implementation defect behind this exploit creates a
false impression on the effectiveness of hiding lists. An ad-
versary may use Exploit 7 to obtain undisclosed social activ-
ities in a victim's SA set without the victim's awareness. A
typical attack on Facebook is given below.
Attack 7. On Facebook, Bob and Carl are Alice's friends. Bob is
Carl's friend, whichmeans Bob is also a friend of Alice's friend.
Alice publishes a social activity which allows her friends and
her friends-of-friends to view, except that Bob is added to the
hiding list of this activity. Although Bob cannot view this ac-
tivity under the current privacy rule, he can break his
connection with Alice. Then, he is automatically removed
from the hiding list. After that, Bob is able to view the undis-
closed activity since he is a friend of Alice's friend.
Note that this attack does not work on Googleþ and Twitter
because their current privacy control mechanisms do not
support any local black lists. Also note Exploit 7 can be
exploited to target at not only SA set, but also PP set and SR set.
We have reported Exploit 7 to Facebook and received a
confirmation from them.3 To prevent this attack in affected
OSNs such as Facebook, the following mitigation strategy can
be applied.
Fig. 6 e Privacy control doesn't enforce the updated privacy
rule to a social activity that has been pushed to a feed page. 3 Exploit 7 has been fixed by Facebook in 2013.
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Mitigation 9. A victim should avoid using hiding lists when pro-
tecting personal information. Instead, a victimmay use white lists or
global black lists in forming privacy rules.
6. Analysis of potentially vulnerable users
A user's personal information in OSNs could be leaked to ad-
versaries who acquire necessary capabilities to perform the
attacks, which have been discussed in Section 5. The effec-
tiveness of the attacks can be affected by users' and their
friends' sharing behaviors in OSNs. To investigate the users
who can be vulnerable to these attacks, we conducted an
online survey and collected users' usage data on Facebook,
Googleþ, and Twitter. In this section, we first describe the
design of the online survey.We then present the demographic
data collected in the survey. Based on the survey results, we
analyze howwidely the users in OSNs can be vulnerable to the
corresponding attacks.
6.1. Methodology
The participants to our online survey are mainly recruited
from undergraduate students in our university. We mainly
focus on young students in our survey because they are
active users of OSNs. Our study shows that they are partic-
ularly vulnerable to the privacy attacks. Each participant
uses at least one OSN among Facebook, Googleþ, and
Twitter.
The survey questionnaire consists of four sections
including 37 questions in total. In the first section, we gave an
initial set of demographic questions and a set of general
questions such as participants' awareness on privacy and
what OSNs (i.e. Facebook, Googleþ, and Twitter) they use. All
the participants need to answer the questions in the first
section. In the following three sections, questions about par-
ticipants' knowledge and privacy attitude towards Facebook,
Googleþ, and Twitter are raised, respectively. Each participant
only needs to answer the questions which are relevant to
them in these three sections.
6.2. Demographics
There are 97 participants in total, among which 60 partici-
pants reported being male, and 37 reported female. Our
participants' age ranges from 18 to 31, with an average of
22.7.
All of the 97 participants are Facebook users, among whom
95 participants have been using Facebook for more than 1
year, and 2 have been using Facebook for less than 1 month.
About a half participants (41/97) are Googleþ users, among
whom 23 participants have been using Googleþ for more than
1 year, 13 have been using Googleþ for about 1 monthe1 year,
and 5 have been using Googleþ for less than 1 month. Simi-
larly, about a half participants (40/97) are Twitter users,
among whom 36 participants have been using Twitter for
more than 1 year, 3 have been using Twitter for about 1
monthe1 year, and 1 has been using Twitter for less than 1
month.
6.3. Attacks to PP set
To obtain the undisclosed personal information in a victim's
PP set, adversaries could exploit the inferable personal par-
ticulars and cross-site incompatibility to launch two corre-
sponding attacks as discussed below.
6.3.1. Inferable personal particulars
As discussed in Section 5.1.1, due to inferable personal
particular (Exploit 1), a victim and most of his/her friends
may share common or similar personal particulars. Our study
results show that 71% of the Facebook users are connected
with their classmates on Facebook; 78% of the Googleþ users
are connected with their classmates on Googleþ; and 73% of
the Twitter users are connected with their classmates on
Twitter.
Via Exploit 1, an adversary could perform Attack 1 and
infer a victim's personal particular from the personal par-
ticulars shared by most of her friends. To perform Attack 1,
two types of knowledge are required: a large portion of
users stored in the victim's SR set and their personal
particulars.
The protection of the victim's SR set could help prevent the
adversary from obtaining the victim's relationships. Unfortu-
nately, our study shows that 22% of the Facebook users, 39% of
the Googleþ users, and 35% of the Twitter users choose the
“Public” privacy rule or the default privacy rule4 for their social
relationships, whichmeans that these users share their social
relationships with the public. Moreover, the OSNs users may
connect to strangers. According to our study, 60% of the
Facebook users, 27% of the Googleþ users, and 30% of the
Twitter users have set up connections with strangers, which
leave their SR set information vulnerable to Exploit 4 (unreg-
ulated relationship recommendation) as discussed in Section
5.2.2.
The privacy rules for personal particulars of the victim's
friends can be set to prevent the adversary from obtaining the
second type of knowledge required in Attack 1. However, the
victim's personal particulars can be exposed to threats if his/
her friends publicly share their personal particulars. In our
study, 43% of the Facebook users, 44% of the Googleþ users,
and 48% of the Twitter users share their personal particular
publicly because they choose the “Public” privacy rule or the
default privacy rule.5
6.3.2. Cross-site incompatibility
Users may use multiple OSNs at the same time. According to
our survey, 54 out of 97 participants use at least two OSNs as
shown in Fig. 7. And 27 participants publish their posts in
more than one OSN at the same time as shown in Fig. 8. If a
user publishes personal information in multiple OSNs, he/she
may set different privacy control rules vulnerable to Exploit 2,
i.e. cross-site incompatibility.
4 Facebook, Googleþ, and Twitter set “Public” as default privacy
rule for the SR set of each user.
5 Facebook, Googleþ, and Twitter set “Public” as the default
privacy rule for each user's personal particulars such as “uni-
versity” information.
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Due to Exploit 2, an adversary can perform Attack 2 if the
victim shares her personal information with the adversary in
any OSN site. This attack is due to three reasons.
The first reason is that users employ inconsistent privacy
rules in different OSNs. The results of our study show that 27
out of 97 participants use inconsistent privacy rules to protect
their gender information, 25 participants use inconsistent
privacy rules to protect their university information, and 21
participants use inconsistent privacy rules to protect their
political view information.
The second reason is that users maintain different social
relationships in different OSNs. According to the study, 59 out
of 97 participants reported that their social relationships on
Facebook, Googleþ, and Twitter are different. Therefore, even
though users protect their information by the same privacy
rules on multiple OSNs, an adversary can still obtain their
information if he can exploit this vulnerability.
The third reason is the difference between privacy control
mechanisms in different OSNs. The protection of gender infor-
mation is a typical example which is discussed in Section 5.1.2.
6.4. Attacks to SR set
Adversaries could obtain social relationships in a victim's SR
set through two exploits, which are inferable social relation-
ship and unregulated recommendation.
6.4.1. Inferable social relationship
Inferable social relationship (Exploit 3) is caused by the stor-
age format of social relationships in SR set as explained in
Section 5.2.1. If two users set up a relationship with each
other, then each of them stores a copy of the relationship in
his/her SR set and choose a privacy rule to protect his/her SR
set.
Via Exploit 3, an adversary could perform Attack 3 given
two types of knowledge, including a list of users in the victim's
SR set and the social relationships in these users' SR set.
Therefore, the protection of the social relationships in the
victim's SR set depends on the privacy rules for the SR sets of
the users in the victim's SR set. Unfortunately, as mentioned
in Section 6.3.1, 22% of the Facebook users, 39% of the Googleþ
users, and 35% of the Twitters share their SR sets publicly.
These users reveal social relationships with their friends
publicly regardless of the privacy rules for their friends' SR
sets.
6.4.2. Unregulated relationship recommendation
REC functionality helps users establish more social relation-
ships. According to our study, 71 out 97 Facebook users, 21 out
of 41 Googleþ users, and 17 out of 40 Twitter users have used
REC functionality in OSNs. Unregulated relationship recom-
mendation (Exploit 4) could leak all social relationships in a
user's SR set due to automatic relationship recommendation
of REC.
By Exploit 4, an adversary can performAttack 4 to obtain all
social relationships in a victim's SR set on Facebook or
Googleþ if the adversary manages to become a “friend” of the
victim.
As shown in Fig. 9, 4% of the Facebook users and 7% of the
Googleþ users choose to share their SR set with a proper
subset of their friends.6 Exploit 4 explicitly violates these
users' privacy rules.
Although most of the Facebook users and the Googleþ
users share their SR sets with friends, friends of friends, or
public, their selection of privacy rules may contradict their
privacy attitude.
In Fig. 9, 53% of the Facebook users share their SR sets with
friends of friends or publicly.7 Among the Facebook users who
share their SR sets with friends of friends or public, 88% of
them address concerns about their social relationships being
revealed to others whom they don't know.
Among the Googleþ users, 36% of them share their SR sets
with friends of friends or the public. However, 71% of the
Googleþ users who share their SR sets with friends of friends
or the public are not willing to reveal their social relationships
to strangers.
As shown in our survey, 43% of the Facebook users and 20%
of the Googleþ users have concerns about revealing their so-
cial relationships to strangers but ever including strangers to
their SR sets. This may leak the users' social relationships to
the strangers irrespective of any privacy rules chosen to pro-
tect their SR sets.
Fig. 7 e Participants' usage of multiple OSNs.
Fig. 8 e Participants' publishing posts in multiple OSNs.
6 An empty subset corresponds to the privacy rule “Only me”.
7 The “Public” privacy rule and the default privacy rule lead to
sharing SR set publicly.
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6.5. Attacks to SA set
To obtain social activity information in a victim's SA set, ad-
versaries could perform 3 attacks due to three exploits
including inferable social activity, ineffective rule update, and
invalid hiding list.
6.5.1. Inferable social activity
In OSNs, if a user is mentioned in his/her friends' social ac-
tivity via TAG, the privacy rule for the activity is determined by
the friends and out of this user's control. This leads to infer-
able social activity (Exploit 5).
Via Exploit 5, an adversary may infer a victim's social
activities from the victim's friends' SA set. As shown in
Fig. 10, 99% of the Facebook users, 44% of the Googleþ users,
and 78% of the Twitter users have experience of being tagged
in activities. On the other hand, 36% of the Facebook users,
34% of the Googleþ users, and 40% of the Twitter users have
concerns about being tagged in certain activities published
by their friends without any negotiations. Since their friends
determine the visibility of the activities, these users can
inform their friends of their concerns. Our results show that
82% of the Facebook users, 73% of the Googleþ users, and 73%
of the Twitter users will inform their friends of their con-
cerns if they don't agree on being tagged by their friends. The
rest of them keep silent even though their privacy could be
violated.
6.5.2. Ineffective rule update
As discussed in Section 5.3.2, if a user changes his/her privacy
rules for social activities, the updated privacy rules do not
apply to the activities which have been pushed to the feed
pages of the user's subscribers. This is named as ineffective
rule update (Exploit 6).
Via Exploit 6, an adversary could perform Attack 6 on
Googleþ and Twitter and obtain a victim's activities which are
shared with the adversary before privacy rules update.
Changing privacy rulesmay occur if users regret publishing
their activities. According to our study, 15% of Googleþ users
and 15% of Twitter users have experience of regretting pub-
lishing their posts. As shown in Fig. 11, 20% of the Googleþ
users choose to change their privacy rules if they regret
sharing activities, while 38% of the Twitter users choose to
change their privacy rules by turning on the protectmy tweets
option if they regret sharing such activities.
To mitigate Exploit 6, users may delete the activities they
regret sharing as soon as possible. We found that 61% of the
Googleþ users and 23% of the Twitter users choose to do so.
6.5.3. Invalid hiding list
On Facebook, if a user protects his/her social activity by using
a hiding list including the user's friends, these friends will be
automatically removed from the hiding list after they termi-
nate their relationshipswith the user. This is referred to as the
invalid hiding list (Exploit 7).
Via Exploit 7, an adversary could performAttack 7 to obtain
a victim's social activities if the victim uses the “friends of
friends” privacy rule with a hiding list containing the adver-
sary. Our study shows that 54% of the Facebook users have
ever used the “friends of friends” privacy rule with a hiding list
that includes their friends when they publish activities. To
evaluate the awareness of the risks caused by using the
invalid hiding list, we summarized participants' confidence
level regarding whether their activities are hidden from their
friends who are included in their hiding lists on Facebook. As
shown in Fig. 12, 31% (30 out of 97) of the Facebook users feel
confident in the effectiveness of the hiding list on Facebook. If
attack 7 happens, these participants may misunderstand the
Fig. 9 e Privacy rules for participants' SR sets in OSNs.
Fig. 10 e Participants being mentioned in OSNs.
Fig. 11 e Participants' actions if regretting sharing
activities.
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validity of the hiding lists and still believe that their activities
are hidden from their friends included in the hiding lists.
7. Discussion
On the surface, our exploits are caused by the inconsistencies
between privacy control and functionalities of OSN. In fact,
these inconsistencies reflect the conflicts between users'
intention on privacy protection and social/business values of
OSNs. We discuss the implications of these conflicts and the
impacts on users' sharing behaviors due to the conflicts in this
section.
Most of the functionalities involved in our exploits are
essential in OSNs. These functionalities deal with personal
particulars, social relationships, and social activities. While
the social values of these functionalities should be preserved
from a user's perspective, they are restricted due to privacy
controls.
First, exhibiting personal particulars is an important
feature for social recognition. Most OSNs encourage users to
share genuine information about their personal particulars in
order to foster trust and respect in OSNs (FaceBook and http://
sec.gov/, 1326). This would help users discover new relation-
ships with those who have similar interests. This is explained
by the homophily theory (McPherson et al., 2001; Centola
et al., 2007), which states that a human being is more willing
to interact with others who have similar personal particulars
such as race, organization, and education. Meanwhile, the
implicit connections among users may be exploited to infer
undisclosed personal particulars. According to Yamada et al.
(2012); Zheleva and Getoor (2009); Dey et al. (2012), 62% of
users consider that their personal particulars published in
OSNs are sensitive. To mitigate this threat for these users,
mitigations 1 and 2 require them to connect with other dis-
similar users which they may not even like.
Second, maintaining and expanding social relationships is
one of the major benefits of OSNs. As socially oriented beings,
humans have a desire to stay connected so that they have a
sense of communion with others (Sheldon and Bettencourt,
2002). This desire is addressed in OSNs with the relationship
list and the recommendation function. Although the public
display of a user's relationship listmay disclose certain private
information, it also helps build more connections in OSNs. If a
user's profile contains a large number of connections, it brings
satisfactory social recognition for the user (Hei-man, 2008).
The recommendation function further makes it easier to
establish new connections based on relationship lists and
other information. This is especially important for new users
to make friends in OSNs. The current recommendation func-
tion operates according to the small-world theory (Watts,
1999), which states that two connected users are likely to
have common friends who have not yet recorded in their
current relationship lists. This function can also be exploited
by an adversary to enumerate all social relationships of a
victim. 45% of users believe that their social relationships in
OSNs are sensitive (Yamada et al., 2012; Dey et al., 2012). Since
the disclosure of the social relationships can be a stepping
stone for advance attacks on personal particulars and social
activities, the protection of the social relationships is also
important to thosewho consider that personal particulars and
social activities are sensitive (Yamada et al., 2012; Dey et al.,
2012; Zheleva and Getoor, 2009). To mitigate the privacy
leakage about social relationships, a user may usemitigations
5 and 6. The consequences of applying these mitigation stra-
tegies are: 1) If a user sets up a strict privacy rule on his rela-
tionship list, this rule should propagate to all users in his
relationship list. 2) The effectiveness of the recommendation
function would be significantly influenced by such
mitigations.
Third, sharing social activities is an important part of
human social life. Human beings are curious about what
happen around them. They would like to understand the
surrounding environment by knowing how other people
behave, think, and feel (Renner, 2006). OSNs enable users to
receive the activities published by other users to cure such
curiosity. On the other hand, users who publish activities feel
rewarded due to attentions of other users, which is usually
interpreted as a sign for social recognition (Hotz). Since a so-
cial activity usually involves multiple users, sharing this ac-
tivity may conflict with the privacy concern of these users.
The social activities are considered as sensitive information
by 66% of users (Yamada et al., 2012; Dey et al., 2012). For these
users, in order to mitigate this threat, the scope of privacy
control in OSNs should be extended as mentioned in mitiga-
tion 7, which enforces privacy control to an activity no matter
who publishes it. An application ofmitigation 7 can be privacy
policy negotiation mechanisms (Wishart et al., 2010; Hu et al.,
2011) which seeks tradeoff between the users' privacy inten-
tion and their desire to share social activity by requiring the
users to choose their privacy rules and sensitivity of each
activity before publishing the activity. However, this may
frustrate users who intend to share that activity, andmight be
difficult to achieve due to the incompatibility among privacy
control mechanisms in different OSNs. As suggested in miti-
gations 3 and 4, a user may choose a strict privacy rule so as to
achieve his privacy objective. However, this may significantly
restrict the sharing nature of OSNs.
While OSN users are concerned with the social values of
OSN functionalities, OSN service providers are more con-
cerned with business values. As a company, the first priority
of an OSN service provider is to generate revenue. However,
most existing OSN service providers do not charge their
Fig. 12 e Users' confidence in validity of Facebook hiding
list.
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users. As Andrew Lewis pointed out, “If you're not paying for
something, you're not the customer; you're the product
being sold.” This is exactly what OSN service providers do,
monetizing user-generated contents by maintaining an
OSN-based ecosystem. One of the most successful OSN-
based business models, targeted advertising (Spaulding,
2010), usually demands high quality of personal informa-
tion and large number of connected individuals (FaceBook
and http://sec.gov/, 1326; Brown, 1950; Coffin, 1963; Wolin
and KorgaonkarBhat, 2003; Danaher and. Mullarkey, 2003).
Thus, an OSN service provider has strong incentive to
encourage users to share personal information, and connect
to more users.
To address users' concern about disclosure of sensitive
personal information, the existing OSN service provider, such
Facebook and Googleþ, provide fine-grained privacy rules for
users. As these privacy rules become more complex, users
could leak their sensitive information due to misunder-
standing and misusing the privacy rules (Wang et al., 2011).
Thus efforts are spent on improving the usability of the pri-
vacy control by automatic content-based reminders (Wang
et al., 2011; Sinha et al., 2013). For example, an automatic
privacy rule recommendation tool is proposed to deduce
users' sharing preferences based on the users' sharing content
in order to help users avoid misconfiguration of the privacy
rules (Sinha et al., 2013). However, the above methods cannot
completely resolve the identified exploits. And these methods
and almost all mitigations discussed in the paper add addi-
tional restrictions on user generated contents published or
shared in OSNs.
8. Related work
Due to wide adoption of OSNs, the privacy problem of OSNs
has attracted strong interest among researchers. We sum-
marize the related work in this area in terms of attacks, pri-
vacy settings, and access control models.
The attack techniques proposed in prior literature mainly
focus on inferring users' identity (Backstrom et al., 2007) and
other personal information (Zheleva and Getoor, 2009;
Balduzzi et al., 2010; Chaabane et al., 2012) from public in-
formation shared in OSNs. Zheleva and Getoor (2009) pro-
posed a classification-based approach to infer users'
undisclosed personal particulars from their social relation-
ships and group information which are publicly shared.
Chaabane et al. (2012) proposed to infer users' undisclosed
personal particulars from public shared interests and public
personal particulars of other users who have similar in-
terests. Balduzzi et al. (2010) utilized email addresses as
unique identifiers to identify and link user profiles across
several popular OSNs. Since users' information may be
shared publicly in an OSN but not be shared in another OSN,
certain hidden information can be revealed by combining
public information collected from different OSNs. The
effectiveness of these attacks largely depends on the quality
of public information, which can be affected due to users'
awareness of privacy concerns. As reported in Chaabane
et al. (2012), only 18% of Facebook users now publicly share
their social relationships and 2% of Facebook users publicly
share their dates of birth. Thus it is more realistic to analyze
the threats caused by more powerful adversaries or insiders
as in our analysis.
The threat of privacy leakage caused by insiders is also
mentioned by Johnson et al. (2012). They investigated users'
privacy concerns on Facebook and discovered that the privacy
control mechanisms in existing OSNs help users manage
outsider threats effectively but cannotmitigate insider threats
because users often wrongly include inappropriate audiences
as members of their friend network. Wang et al. (2011)
analyzed reasons why users wrongly configure privacy set-
tings and provided suggestions for users to avoid such mis-
takes. To help users handle complex privacy policy
management, Cheek and Shehab, (2012) proposed two ap-
proaches using clustering techniques to assist users in
grouping friends and setting appropriate privacy rules. How-
ever, as shown in our work, privacy leakage could still happen
even if a user correctly configures his privacy settings due to
the exploits caused by inherent conflicts between privacy
control and OSN functionalities.
Some researchers addressed the privacy control problem
in traditional access control modeling. Several models (Fong
et al., 2009; Carminati et al., 2009) are established to provide
more flexible and fine-grained control so as to increase the
expressive power of privacy control models. Nevertheless,
this is not sufficient to guarantee effective privacy protection.
From our analysis on information flows, OSN functionalities
may be affected by privacy control. On the other hand, a more
complex privacy control model increases users' burden on
configuring privacy rules.
One of the exploits found in our work (Exploit 5) is also
mentioned in previous research on resolving privacy con-
flicts in collaborative data sharing. Wishart et al. (2010) and
Hu et al. (2011) analyzed co-owned information disclosure
due to conflicts of privacy rules set by multiple owners.
They also introduced a negotiation mechanism to seek a
balance between the risk of privacy leakage and the benefit
of data sharing. Compared to them, our work investigates a
broader range of privacy threats in OSNs, discovers the
underlying conflicts between privacy control and social/
business values of OSNs, and analyzes the difficulty in
resolving these conflicts, which have not been addressed in
previous works.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated privacy leakage under privacy
control in online social networks. Our analysis showed that
privacy leakage could still happen even after users correctly
configure their privacy settings. We examined real-world
OSNs including Facebook, Googleþ, and Twitter, and discov-
ered the exploits which lead to privacy leakage. Based on the
findings, a series of attacks were introduced for adversaries
with different capabilities to learn undisclosed personal in-
formation. We analyzed necessary conditions and provided
suggestions for users to mitigate privacy leakage in OSNs. We
conducted a user study to investigate the potentially vulner-
able users due to the attacks. In the end, we discussed the
implications of resolving privacy leakage in OSNs.
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Appendix A. Proof of Necessary Condition 1
The input of an adversary includes two types of knowledge
about a victim: a subset U¼ {u1,u2,…,un} of a victim v's SR set in
an OSN, and personal particular value ppui ðppuisnullÞ of each
receiver ui2 U. The adversary may infer the victim's personal
particular ppv (ppvs null) by calculating the common personal
particular value shared by most of the victim's friends with
Algorithm 1.
Given the inputs, if Algorithm 1 returns a value ppinfer
which is equal to the victim's personal particular ppv, then the
victim's personal particular information is leaked to the
adversary.
Appendix B. Proof of Necessary Condition 2
A victim uses the privacy rules pr1,pr2,…,prn to protect her
personal particular published in OSN1,OSN2,…,OSNn, respec-
tively where each privacy rule pri ¼ (wli,bli) contains a white
listwli and a black list bli. Assuming there are two privacy rules
prt and prj such that ðwltybltswljybljÞ where t,j 2 {1,2,…,n}
and t s j, we have Udiff ¼ ðwltybltÞyðwljybljÞs. If an ad-
versary adv 2 Udiff, then the victim's personal information is
leaked to the adversary although the information is supposed
to be hidden from the adversary by prj on OSNj.
Appendix C. Proof of Necessary Condition 3
A victim v sets the privacy rule prv¼ (wlv,blv) for her SR set with
white listwlv and black list blv. The victim's SR includes a set of
users U ¼ {u1,u2,…,un}. Each user ui sets the privacy rule
pri ¼ (wli,bli) for his/her SR set with white list wli and black list
bli for all i 2 {1,2,…,n}. Assuming an adversary adv is not in
wlvyblv, the adversary is not allowed to view any relation-
ships in the victim's SR set. If there is a privacy rule prt such
that wltyblt is not a subset of wlvyblv and t2 {1,2,…,n}, then
we haveUdiff ¼ ðwltybltÞyðwlvyblvÞs. Assuming adv2 Udiff,
then the relationship between user ut and victim v is knownby
adversary adv although the information in the victim's SR set
should be hidden from adv by prv.
Appendix D. Proof of Necessary Condition 4
A victim sets a privacy rule prv ¼ (wlv,blv) for her SR set with
white listwlv and black list blv. The victim's SR includes a set of
users U ¼ {u1,u2,…,un}. Assuming that U is not a subset of
wlvyblv, then we have Udiff ¼ UyðwlvyblvÞs. If adversary
adv 2 Udiff, then REC functionality recommends almost all
users in U to adv. Note that these users should be hidden from
adv by privacy rule prv because adv is not in wlvyblv.
Appendix E. Proof of Necessary Condition 5
Given a privacy rule pru¼ (wlu,blu) for an activitywithwhite list
wlu and black list bluwhere victim v is mentioned by her friend
u, any receivers inwluyblu are allowed to view the activity.We
assume that v's intended privacy rule for the activity is
prv ¼ (wlv,blv) with white listwlv and black list blv. If wluyblu is
not a subset of wlvyblv, then we have Udiff ¼ ðwluybluÞy
ðwlvyblvÞs. Assuming adv 2 Udiff, then adv can obtain the
activity published by u although the victim's privacy rule prv
prevents adv from viewing the activity.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data related to this article can be found at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2014.10.012.
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